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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arrives on appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to 
defendant/counterclaimant/respondent D&L Ventures, Inc., (“D&L”) in a suit brought by 
plaintiff/counter-defendant Philip P. McGimpsey (“McGimpsey”).  McGimpsey filed suit against 
D&L and against David B. Asher claiming that D&L and Asher breached a buy-sell agreement 
to convey real property to McGimpsey.1  See generally, R., p. 14-22.   The Buy-Sell Agreement, 
dated June 26, 2017 (“Buy-Sell Agreement”), relates to real property owned by D&L, commonly 
known as 539 W. Oakhampton Dr., Eagle, Idaho (the “Residence”).  R., p. 24-31.   By Answer 
and Counterclaim filed December 21, 2017, D&L denied Plaintiff’s claim and counterclaimed 
for (1) declaratory judgment that D&L did not breach the buy-sell agreement; (2) breach of 
contract against the purported buyers of the Residence, McGimpsey and McGimpsey as the 
Trustee of the JJM Special Needs Trust (the “Trust”)2; (3) breach of the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing as to the terms of the Buy-Sell Agreement; (4) action to quiet title and for 
declaratory judgment that McGimpsey, the Trust, and Jolene McGimpsey (Philip’s wife) have no 
right, title, or interest in and to the Residence; (5) ejectment and restitution of property related to 
McGimpsey and Jolene McGimpsey’s unlawful detainer of the Residence to D&L and for 
judgment equal to the fair rental value of the Residence from September 14, 2017, through the 
                                                 
1 McGimpsey and the Trust are both parties to the Buy-Sell Agreement.  The Trust, however, was not a party to 
Plaintiff’s Complaint. See generally, R., p. 14-22.  D&L named McGimpsey as Trustee of the Trust because the 
Trust was listed as a party to the Buy-Sell Agreement. Judgment was entered in favor of D&L upon its claim for 
Declaratory relief, i.e., that D&L had the legal ability to convey the Residence and that it did not breach the Buy-
Sell Agreement.       
2 The Trust did not appear in the action. Thus, the District Court entered its Order Entering Default Against Third-
Party Defendant, Philip P. McGimpsey as Trustee of the JJM Special Needs Trust on February 21, 2018.   
2 
date of eviction in the amount of $2,400 per month, plus fines and fees as provided by the Buy-
Sell Agreement. R., p. 60-72.   
On February 26, 2018, D&L filed its motion for summary judgment seeking entry of 
judgment as a matter of law decreeing that D&L was entitled to judgment as to all claims 
asserted.   Following a hearing held on April 10, 2018, the district court correctly ruled that 
D&L’s non-registration with the Idaho Secretary of State did not affect its ability to sell the 
Residence or the validity of the Buy-Sell Agreement, and thus granted summary judgment to 
D&L that D&L had the legal ability to convey the Residence to McGimpsey and the Trust. R., p. 
340. Consequently, because D&L did not breach the Buy-Sell Agreement simply by failing to be 
registered with the Idaho Secretary of State at the time of the execution of the Buy-Sell 
Agreement. Id.  The district court also correctly ruled that D&L established that McGimpsey 
breached the Buy-Sell Agreement by failing to close on the Residence and that McGimpsey 
failed to establish that his breach was excused by D&L’s alleged inability to convey marketable 
title.  Upon D&L’s claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the district 
court ruled that, in light of the relief awarded pursuant to the breach of contract claim, the 
implied covenant claim was moot.  The district court also correctly perceived that no adverse 
claim was asserted by McGimpsey or the Trust in opposition to the motion for summary 
judgment upon the claim for quiet title and thus, the claim was moot.  Finally, the district court 
correctly ruled that McGimpsey and Jolene McGimpsey continued to reside in the Residence, 
without paying rent, since the failed closing, and that D&L was entitled to possession of the 
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Residence, together with restitution for the fair rental value of the Residence in the amount of 
$2,400.00 per month as set forth in the parties’ Buy-Sell Agreement.    
McGimpsey now appeals.  Jolene McGimpsey has joined in McGimpsey’s opening brief 
on appeal, particularly with respect to the restitution claim.  McGimpsey as Trustee of the Trust 
filed a notice of appeal on June 19, 2018, but did not join in McGimpsey’s opening brief on 
appeal.  Accordingly, D&L requests that any appeal by McGimpsey as Trustee of the Trust be 
dismissed on its face.   
II. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
D&L is the owner of the Residence located at 539 W. Oakhampton Drive, Eagle, Idaho.  
D&L is a Nevada corporation.  R., p. 134, ¶ 1. The sole shareholders of D&L are David Asher 
and Georgina Lori Asher. Id.   D&L registered with the Idaho Secretary of State as a Nevada 
corporation on October 17, 2017, and filed all required tax returns and other obligations. R., p. 
62, ¶ 8; see also D&L response to Request for Admission Nos. 29 and 32, attached as Exhibit 1 
to Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment Supporting Brief, R., p. 233.  
Effective June 26, 2017, McGimpsey and McGimpsey as Trustee of the Trust entered 
into the Buy-Sell Agreement with D&L for the purchase of the Residence.  R., p. 135, ¶6, 140-
145.  Under the Buy-Sell Agreement, the parties agreed to a purchase price of $485,000.00 with 
$5,000.00 to be paid as earnest money and the remainder to be paid at closing. R., p. 140-145.  
Pursuant to Paragraph 3 of the Buy-Sell Agreement, closing was to occur on or before September 
13, 2017.  Id. at p. 140, ¶3.  For a period of approximately three years prior to the Closing, 
McGimpsey and his wife, Jolene McGimpsey, were tenants of the Residence. R., p. 135, ¶ 8.  
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Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of the Buy-Sell Agreement, McGimpsey and Jolene McGimpsey were to 
pay D&L rent on the Residence in the sum of $2,400.00 per month, and, if payment was made 
after the 4th of the month, then a $100.00 late fee plus $10.00 per day for every day payment was 
late. R., p. 141. ¶ 6.  The Buy-Sell Agreement further stated:  
If Buyer fails to complete the purchase, or under any of the options or 
contingencies granted herein, terminates this agreement, then Buyer agrees 
to vacate the Property by 11:59 PM on the last day of the month in which 
the purchase deal fails to consummate, or is terminated.  
R., p. 141, ¶ 6. 
 The Buy-Sell Agreement also provided that if McGimpsey failed to consummate the 
transaction for any reason other than those allowed by the Buy-Sell Agreement, D&L could 
declare the Buy-Sell Agreement void and could retain McGimpsey’s earnest money. R., p. 143, ¶ 
14. 
The Buy-Sell Agreement was made contingent upon McGimpsey’s receipt and approval 
of the preliminary title commitment. R., p. 142, ¶ 9.  At closing, D&L agreed to convey the 
Residence by warranty deed.  R., p. 142, ¶ 10.   
D&L was ready, willing and able to close the transaction on the day of closing and was 
prepared to execute a warranty deed and all other closing documents.  R., p. 135, ¶ 10.   On 
September 13, 2017, the Closing date, Asher contacted the title company, TitleOne to see 
whether McGimpsey had signed the closing documents and delivered the funds. R., p. 136, ¶ 11.  
Asher was informed that none of this had occurred and that McGimpsey had not appeared, 
executed and delivered any documents, or communicated on such day that he was going to 
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appear. R., p. 136, ¶ 11. Despite failing to consummate the transaction, McGimpsey and Jolene 
McGimpsey remained in the Residence and only paid rent through September, 2017.  No rent, 
late charges, or daily late fees were paid after September, 2017, through the date of eviction. R., 
p. 136, ¶ 13, 16.   
On November 3, 2017, McGimpsey filed his Complaint for breach of the Buy-Sell 
Agreement. R., p. 14-51.3  On December 21, 2017, D&L filed is Verified Answer, Counterclaim 
and Third-Party Complaint against McGimpsey, McGimpsey as Trustee of the Trust, and Jolene 
McGimpsey.4  R., p. 60-79.  D&L was granted an Order of Default against McGimpsey as the 
Trustee of the Trust on February 21, 2018.  D&L subsequently brought a motion for summary 
judgment. R., p. 122-125.  McGimpsey opposed D&L’s motion for summary judgment, filed a 
motion to reschedule the hearing upon D&L’s motion for summary judgment, and filed his own 
motion for summary judgment. R., p. 167-169 (motion to reschedule summary judgment hearing 
date and Amended Motion to Reschedule Summary Judgment Hearing Date at R., p. 185-187); 
R., p. 201-204 (Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment); R., p. 204-206 (Plaintiff’s Summary 
Judgment Opposition Brief/Response); R., p. 207-224 (Plaintiff’s Summary Judgment 
Supporting Brief).   
                                                 
3 David Asher was not a party to the Buy-Sell Agreement and McGimpsey did not set forth a claim against him 
individually.  Thus, as noted by the district court, it is unclear why he was named as a party.  See e.g., R., p. 359, 
FN. 1.   
4 Jolene McGimpsey was not a party to the Buy-Sell Agreement but she initialed the provision regarding payment of 
rent and signed the Buy-Sell Agreement as “Lessee.”  See e.g., R., p. 335, R., pp. 141, 144.  
6 
 After briefing and oral argument upon D&L’s Motion for Summary Judgment, held 
April 10, 2018, McGimpsey filed his Notice of Summary Judgment Hearing [R. p. 297] and Rule 
56 Motion to Reconcile Record on Summary Judgment. R., p. 304-306.   
On April 25, 2018, the district court issued a written Memorandum Decision and Order 
on Motion for Summary Judgment re: Counterclaims and 56(d) Motion. R., p. 333-348.  In his 
decision, Judge Hippler determined that: (1) D&L’s non-registration did not affect its ability to 
sell the Residence or the validity of the Buy-Sell Agreement; (2) D&L had the legal ability to 
convey the Residence to McGimpsey and the Trust and consequently D&L did not breach the 
Buy-Sell Agreement simply by failing to be registered with the Idaho Secretary of State at the 
time of the execution of the Buy-Sell Agreement; (3) McGimpsey breached the Buy-Sell 
Agreement by failing to close on the Residence and that McGimpsey failed to establish that his 
breach was excused by D&L’s alleged inability to convey marketable title; (4) in light of the 
relief warranted pursuant to the breach of contract claim, D&L’s implied covenant claim was 
moot; (5) that there was no claim to title adverse to D&L’s claim for quiet title and thus the 
claim was moot; and finally (6) that McGimpsey and Jolene McGimpsey continued to reside in 
the Residence, without paying rent, since the failed closing, and that D&L was entitled to 
possession of the Residence, together with restitution for the fair rental value of the Residence in 
the amount of $2,400.00 per month as set forth in the parties’ Buy-Sell Agreement. R., p. 333-
348. Upon McGimpsey’s motion for additional time, the district court found that the information 
sought by McGimpsey’s Rule 56(d) request would not aid in defeating the claims of D&L and 
consequently denied the motion.  R., p. 333-348. 
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Following the district court’s decision granting summary judgment to D&L, McGimpsey 
filed a document entitled Supplemental Summary Judgment Supporting Brief. R, p. 349-357.  On 
May 7, 2018, the district court thus entered its Order re: Judgment and Vacating Summary 
Judgment Hearing.  R., p. 358-362.  Therein, Judge Hippler determined that “in responding to 
D&L’s motion for summary judgment, McGimpsey simply referred the Court to the 
memorandum in support of his summary judgment motion. Thus, all the pending claims were 
effectively placed at issue for purposes of D&L’s summary judgment motion.” R., p. 359.  The 
district court reiterated his summary judgment findings and decision before noting that the 
judgment proposed by D&L included a provision dismissing McGimpsey’s claims with 
prejudice.  R., p. 360.  The district court then acknowledged that McGimpsey’s Supplemental 
Summary Judgment Brief raised a defense based upon Rule 8(6)(6).  Therein, McGimpsey 
claimed that D&L’s failure to properly deny certain allegations in the Complaint resulted in 
admissions, thereby creating a question of fact as to whether D&L breached the Buy-Sell 
Agreement.  The district court disagreed and held that McGimpsey’s “reliance on procedural 
rules to avoid judgment in this matter is misplaced.” R., p. 361.  In support, the district court held 
that Rule 8(b)(3), I.R.C.P., allows a party to generally deny allegations of a pleading except 
those specifically admitted. R., p. 361.  Paragraph 1 of D&L’s Answer contained such a denial 
and thus, there was no claim set forth in the Complaint that was not addressed by the court’s 
prior Decision and Order.  Consequently, the district court reasoned that the practical effect of 
his prior decision was the dismissal of McGimpsey’s Complaint and that Judgment in favor of 
D&L and Asher was warranted. R., p. 361.  For these reasons, the district court vacated the 
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hearing upon Plaintiff’s own motion for summary judgment.  Id. The Court’s Judgment followed 
on May 7, 2018.  
D&L filed its Motion for Attorney’s Fees and Costs on May 10, 2018.  R., p. 366-382.  
McGimpsey filed his Notice of Appeal from the Judgment on May 11, 2018.  At the same time, 
Plaintiff filed his Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) Motions [R., p. 400-403, supporting brief at R., p. 
404-418], together with Plaintiff’s Rule 62(b) Motion and Brief [R., p. 419-424].  McGimpsey 
filed his Rule 54(d)(5) Motion to Disallow Costs and Attorney Fees on May 21, 2018 [R., p. 
431-437], followed by Defendants’ Objection and Response to Plaintiff’s 59(e) and 60(b) 
Motions [R., p. 438-440] and also Plaintiff’s 62(b) Motion on May 24, 2018 [R. p., 441-444].  
On the day the 14-day stay provided to McGimpsey by virtue of Idaho Appellate Rule 13(a) ws 
set to expire, Third-Party Defendant Jolene McGimpsey filed her own Notice of Appeal from the 
district court’s judgment on May 25, 2018. R., p. 445-449.  D&L’s Reply Memorandum in 
Support of Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs followed on May 30, 2018. R., p. 463-469.   A 
hearing upon the above-referenced post-judgment motions was held on June 1, 2018. See e.g., 
R., p. 470-473.  Following the hearing, Plaintiff submitted his Post-Hearing Rule 59(e), Rule 
60(b)(6), and Rule 54(d)(5) Brief. R., p. 474-482.  As with expiration of the automatic 14-day 
stay provided to Jolene McGimpsey by virtue of Idaho Appellate Rule 13(a), Third-Party 
Defendant McGimpsey, as Trustee of the Trust, filed his [Third] Notice of Appeal from the 
district court’s judgment on June 19, 2018. R., p. 486-490.   
On July 3, 2018, the district court entered his Order on Motion for Relief from Judgment 
and Stay. R., p. 491-496. Therein, following six-pages of reasoned analysis of Plaintiff’s claims, 
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the district court correctly held “McGimpsey’s allegations of error are entirely lacking in 
foundation. As such, his motion under IRCP 59(e) and IRCP 60(b)(6) is denied, thereby 
rendering his motion for a stay under IRCP 62(b) moot.” R., p. 485.   
On July 24, 2018, the district court entered his Order on Attorney Fees and Costs, 
granting D&L an award of costs, but not attorney’s fees. R., p. 508-514.  An Amended Judgment 
followed on July 24, 2018.  R., p. 515-518.  A Second Amended Judgment issued on September 
7, 2018, [R., p. 579-581], following a Motion to Amend Amended Judgment filed by D&L on 
August 2, 2018.  In primary part, the Motion to Amend Amended Judgment was filed to account 
for additional restitution occasioned by the McGimpseys’ three notices of appeal and the 
automatic stay instituted thereon.  R., p. 523-532, Affidavit of Kimbell D. Gourley in Support, 
R., p. 533-542.  McGimpsey’s Rule 59(e)-Rule 60(b) Opposition Brief followed on August 15, 
2018. R., p. 554-559.  
On September 7, 2018, the district court entered his Order on Motion to Amend 
Amended Judgment, granting D&L’s Motion.  R, p. 573-578.  Therein, the district court 
reasoned:  
Following the entry of judgment, the McGimpseys refused to vacate the 
premises. Philip McGimpsey filed a notice of appeal on May 11, 2018, 
thereby obtaining a 14-day stay. The day the stay expired, Jolene 
McGimpsey filed a notice of appeal, thus extending the stay until June 8, 
2018. After the expiration of the second stay, the McGimpseys still did not 
vacate. Instead, on June 19, 2019 [sic s/be 2018] the JJM Special Needs 
Trust filed a notice of appeal, despite having been defaulted and not 




The judgment –which was issued on May 7, 2018- only ordered restitution 
for unpaid rent through April 30, 2018 as opposed to the date of eviction, 
which is what D&L requested in its pleadings.  The correct course would 
have been to reserve the entry of judgment on the restitution amount until 
after eviction had been accomplished, thereby avoiding the very situation 
presented here. Rule 59(e) allows the Court to correct the error post-
judgment.  The evidence establishes that the McGimpseys did not vacate 
the premises until June 29, 2018. As such, D&L is entitled to additional 
restitution for the period of time between May 1, 2018 and June 29, 2018, 
which D&L has calculated to be $4720. 
R., p. 575-576.  The Second Amended Judgment issued the same day, September 7, 2018.  R., p. 
579-581. 
III. RESTATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether the district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of D&L.   
2. Whether the district court correctly dismissed McGimpsey’s Complaint. 
3. Whether the district court correctly awarded restitution to D&L. 
4. Whether D&L is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code § 12-121.5 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
                                                 
5 McGimpsey’s statement of issues on appeal is disjointed and does not logically follow the standard of 
review that guides this Court’s resolution of the issues raised and decided by the district court.  Distilled 
to their essence, McGimpsey’s issues on appeal are:  
1. Whether the district court erred in its sua sponte decision to vacate the hearing upon Plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment;  
2. Whether the district court deprived Plaintiff of his right to a jury trial upon the claim alleged in 
Plaintiff’s Complaint;  
3. Whether the Judgment is valid pursuant to Rule 54 and 58; and finally,  
4. Whether the district court erred in awarding restitution damages to D&L. 
McGimpsey’s statement of issues on appeal does not address, nor does it specifically challenge, the 
factual or legal reasoning of the district court in granting summary judgment to D&L.  Rather, 
McGimpsey repeatedly challenges the district court’s post-judgment decisions, of which there were 
several, to deny McGimpsey the relief sought by McGimpsey’s Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) Motions.  
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An Idaho appellate court reviewing a ruling on summary judgment employs the same 
standard as the district court below.  Erland v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 136 Idaho 131, 133, 30 P.3d 
286, 288 (2001).  Under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary judgment is proper “if 
the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled a judgment 
as a matter of law.”  Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(c).  In order to demonstrate a genuine issue of material 
fact, the party opposing the motion must present more than a conclusory assertion that an issue 
of fact exists.    Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mocaby, 133 Idaho 593, 596, 990 P.2d 1204, 1207 (1999).   
Instead, the party opposing summary judgment must respond to the motion with specific facts 
showing there is a general issue for trial.  Id.; see also Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(e) (“[A]n adverse 
party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party’s pleadings, but the party’s 
response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing 
that there is a genuine issue for trial.”).  A mere scintilla of evidence or only a slight doubt as to 
the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment.  Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 
Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986).  Moreover, the existence of disputed facts will not 
defeat summary judgment when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the 
existence of an element essential to his case, and on which he will bear the burden of proof at 
trial.  E.g., Garzee v. Barkley, 121 Idaho 771, 774, 828 P.2d 334, 337 (Ct. App. 1992).   
Where the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then only a question of 
law remains, the Supreme Court exercises free review. JBM, LLC v. Cintorino, 159 Idaho 772, 
367 P.3d 167, 170 (2016) (citations omitted).  
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V. ARGUMENT 
A. District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment in This Case Because There 
Was No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Precluding Entry of Judgment upon D&L’s 
Counterclaims. 
 
 In a well-reasoned, logical, and legally sound decision, the district court correctly concluded 
that D&L had the legal ability to convey the property via warranty deed to McGimpsey and the 
Trust and that D&L did not breach the Buy-Sell Agreement simply by failing to be registered with 
the Idaho Secretary of State.   As recognized by the district court, foreign entities are governed by 
the Idaho Uniform Business Code set forth in Chapter 21, Title 30 of the Idaho Code. Idaho Code § 
30-21-502 states, in pertinent part, 
(a) A foreign filing entity or foreign limited liability partnership may not do 
business in this state until it registers with the secretary of state under this 
chapter. 
(b) A foreign filing entity or foreign limited liability partnership doing 
business in this state may not maintain an action or proceeding in this state 
unless it is registered to do business in this state. 
(c) The failure of a foreign filing entity or foreign limited liability 
partnership to register to do business in this state does not impair the validity 
of a contract or act of the foreign filing entity or foreign limited liability 
partnership or preclude it from defending an action or proceeding in this 
state. 
… 
I.C. § 30-21-502.  As reiterated by the Court in Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'l Med. Ctr., 151 
Idaho 889, 265 P.3d 502 (2011): 
The interpretation of a statute “must begin with the literal words of the 
statute; those words must be given their plain, usual, and ordinary meaning; 
and the statute must be construed as a whole. If the statute is not ambiguous, 
this Court does not construe it, but simply follows the law as written.” State 
v. Schwartz, 139 Idaho 360, 362, 79 P.3d 719, 721 (2003) (citations 
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omitted). “We have consistently held that where statutory language is 
unambiguous, legislative history and other extrinsic evidence should not be 
consulted for the purpose of altering the clearly expressed intent of the 
legislature.” City of Sun Valley v. Sun Valley Co., 123 Idaho 665, 667, 851 
P.2d 961, 963 (1993). 
Id., at 893, 265 P.3d at 506. 
 The district court properly analyzed the application of Idaho Code § 30-21-502(b) to 
conclude that D&L was entitled to the relief it sought in this case. R., p. 336-339.  The district 
court’s reliance upon JBM, LLC v. Cintorino, 159 Idaho at __, 367 P.3d at 172 to support this 
finding was well-placed. See R., p. 338.  In JBM, a limited liability company brought suit to recover 
upon a business transaction involving the assignment of a promissory note by an unregistered 
foreign entity.  JBM, 159 Idaho at __ 367 P.3d at 172.   The district court dismissed the complaint, 
finding that although the company obtained a certificate of authority prior to bringing suit, it had not 
obtained the certificate at the time of the transaction.  Id., 159 Idaho at __ 367 P.3d at 171.   On 
appeal, the Court reversed, holding that “while IABNA prohibits an entity in violation from filing 
suit in Idaho, it does not invalidate contracts entered into by that entity.” Id., (citing Nowels v. 
Ketchersid Music, Inc., 80 Idaho 486, 491, 333 P.2d 869, 871 (1958)).  Thus, the JBM Court held: 
JBM Company's alleged violations of IABNA and IULLCA have no 
effect on its ability to assign the promissory note to McAdams, LLC. 
Additionally, the alleged violations do not affect the validity or 
enforceability of the promissory note and personal guarantees. JBM 
Company's alleged violations of IABNA and IULLCA are not defenses to 
the validity or the enforceability of the rights assigned to McAdams, LLC. 
Rather, if JBM Company was in violation of Idaho Code section 30–6–
808(1) or 53–509, it would lack capacity to file suit in the state until the 
violation was cured. Nowels, 80 Idaho at 491–92, 333 P.2d at 871. 
 
Id., 159 Idaho at__, 367 P.3d at 172 (emphasis added).    
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 In his opening brief, McGimpsey asserts that Idaho Code § 30-21-502 applies to prohibit 
D&L from conveying marketable title to the Residence because D&L lacked access to Idaho Courts 
and thus could not have honored any warranties of a statutory warranty deed.  Appellant’s Opening 
Brief, p. 15-17.  Thus, McGimpsey argues that D&L was legally incapable of performing the Buy-
Sell Agreement.  These arguments are misplaced and are not supported by a plain reading of Idaho 
Code § 30-21-502.  
 As correctly recognized by the district court, it is undisputed that D&L was an unregistered 
foreign entity at the time it purchased the Residence in 2013, leased the Residence to the 
McGimpseys from 2014-2017, and executed the Buy-Sell Agreement in June, 2017. R., p. 337.  It 
was also undisputed, however, that D&L was registered with the Idaho Secretary of State when it 
filed its Counterclaim in December, 2017.  R., p. 337.  Thus, as correctly held by the district court, 
nothing in Idaho Code § 30-21-502 prevented D&L from maintaining its Counterclaims once it 
“cured” its alleged violation of Idaho Code § 30-21-502(a) when it registered with the Idaho 
Secretary of State in October, 2017. R., p. 338.   Nothing in Idaho Code § 30-21-502 invalidated the 
Buy-Sell Agreement between McGimpsey, the Trust and D&L.  D&L had the legal ability to 
convey the property to McGimpsey and the Trust and did not breach the Buy-Sell simply by failing 
to be registered with the Idaho Secretary of State at the time of the execution of the Buy-Sell 
Agreement.  The district court correctly granted summary judgment on D&L’s declaratory 
judgment claim.  
 McGimpsey next relies upon hypothetical examples to posit that he was excused from 
performance of the Buy-Sell Agreement because he, as a reasonably prudent buyer, was excused 
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from proceeding to closing due to the fact that D&L was unregistered as of September 13, 2017.  
Although unclear, this argument appears to relate to the district court’s grant of summary judgment 
upon D&L’s claim for breach of contract against McGimpsey and the Trust (Count Two).  Upon 
this claim, the district court found that it was undisputed that McGimpsey and the Trust refused to 
complete the purchase. R., p. 341.  The district court’s finding is supported by the evidentiary 
record, namely, the uncontroverted Affidavit of David B. Asher in Support of Counterclaimant/ 
Third-Party Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ¶ 10 and 11.   
 McGimpsey’s argument as to what a “reasonably prudent buyer” would do as a result of 
D&L’s registration status is made without any citation to any facts or legal authority that would 
support such an argument. Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 17-18. A party waives an issue on appeal 
if either argument or authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 
(Ct.App.1997).  To be clear, McGimpsey did not submit a single affidavit, nor did he supply any 
admissible evidence to support his theories in this case. See generally, Record.  Rather, the record 
before the district court and before this Court establishes that McGimpsey did not appear at the 
closing and did not complete his obligation to tender funds to close the transaction on September 13, 
2017.  D&L submitted evidence to establish that it was prepared to close on the transaction and to 
convey the Residence to McGimpsey pursuant to the Buy-Sell Agreement.    
 McGimpsey now complains that the district court’s decision does not expressly decide 
whether his breach was “material” or “merely incidental” to the June 26, 2017 Buy-Sell Agreement 
or whether D&L’s failure to attend the closing was a “like kind breach.”  These arguments were not 
raised and/or were not supported by cogent argument or authority before the district court and are 
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not briefed on this appeal. See e.g., R., p. 412.  A party waives an issue on appeal if either argument 
or authority is lacking. Powell, 130 Idaho at 128, 937 P.2d at 440 (Ct.App.1997). 
 The materiality argument was first raised in McGimpsey’s Supplemental Summary 
Judgment Brief, R., p. 349-354 at 353, with no analysis or factual support.  The materiality 
argument was next raised by Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) Motions, R., p. 400-418, at 412, 
again with no analysis or factual support.  The district court, in its discretion, refused these 
arguments, stating: 
simply because the issues of breach and its materiality are questions of fact 
does not preclude summary judgment where – as here – the material facts are 
determined to be undisputed and only one reasonable inference can be drawn 
therefrom. … In opposing summary judgment, McGimpsey failed to raise 
any genuine dispute as to the facts relevant to breach and materiality. Thus, 
the Court was justified in entering judgment as a matter of law.  
Order on Motion for Relief from Judgment and Stay, R., p. 495.  The district court was within its 
discretion to refuse to consider McGimpseys argument that was unsupported by law or fact and 
McGimpsey has not urged, on appeal, any cognizable basis to find an abuse of discretion.  Namely, 
no citation is made to any evidentiary record or legal authority that would support a finding that 
McGimpsey’s failure to appear at the closing, tender funds, or sign closing documents would be 
“merely incidental” to the Buy-Sell Agreement.  Moreover, the reliance upon a “like kind breach” 
by D&L for its failure to attend the closing was not raised below.  The evidence presented to the 
district court established that D&L was ready, willing, and able to close the transaction. McGimpsey 
presented no contrary evidence.   
 McGimpsey’s repeated reliance upon D&L’s ability to convey the property pursuant to a 
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warranty deed do not raise any genuine issue of material fact where McGimpsey failed to establish, 
by way of admissible evidence and citations to legal authority, an affirmative defense to D&L’s 
counterclaim for breach of the Buy-Sell Agreement.   
B. The District Court Properly Dismissed McGimpsey’s Complaint. 
 In a section commencing mid-way through the brief, entitled “Defendants’ Procedural 
Breaches of Contract,” McGimpsey argues that the district court erred in dismissing “Count Two” 
of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 23.  Plaintiff’s Complaint contains a single 
cause of action for breach of contract labeled as Count One.  Plaintiff’s prayer for relief, however, 
requests declaratory relief that D&L acted in violation of Idaho Code § 30-21-502 (paragraphs 1 and 
2), for a finding that D&L breached the Buy-Sell Agreement (paragraph 3); for specific 
performance of the Buy-Sell Agreement (paragraph 4), an alternative claim for money damages due 
to D&L’s breach of the Buy-Sell Agreement (paragraph 5), and finally, for attorney fees and costs 
(paragraph 6).  As properly held by the district court, McGimpsey’s allegations/claims were 
resolved by the district court’s determination that D&L was legally capable of transferring the 
property and maintaining its counterclaims and that D&L did not breach the Buy-Sell Agreement. 
McGimpsey has failed to produce cogent authority or analysis to support a finding that the district 
court erred in its grant of summary judgment to Respondent.  Rather, McGimpsey advances a 
collateral attack upon the district court’s decision by arguing that McGimpsey’s claim/prayer for 
relief was not squarely addressed in the procedural manner McGimpsey envisioned would occur.  
McGimpsey previously raised constitutional and procedural challenges to the district court’s 
judgment by way of post-judgment motion practice which motions were addressed and rejected. See 
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R., p. 358-362 (Order re Judgment and Vacating Summary Judgment Hearing); R., p. 491-496 
(Order on Motion for Relief from Judgment and Stay); R., p. 573-578 (Order on Motion to Amend 
Amended Judgment).   
 Although McGimpsey’s claims were fully briefed in support of McGimpsey’s own motion 
for summary judgment, McGimpsey contends now, as he did before the district court in post-
Judgment pleadings, that he was deprived of due process in the district court’s incomplete 
consideration of McGimpsey’s arguments.  Following entry of summary judgment, McGimpsey 
filed his Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) Motions wherein McGimpsey asserted that the judgment 
wrongfully deprived McGimpsey of his constitutional right to a jury trial upon his breach of 
contract claim, that the judgment deprived McGimpsey of the fundamental opportunity to be heard, 
and that the judgment was not valid. R., p. 400-403.  In summary, McGimpsey simply argued that 
he was deprived of an opportunity to be heard upon his motion for summary judgment. See 
generally, R., p. 404-418.   McGimpsey further asserts that had he been permitted to be heard, he 
would have “explained why it was impossible for any foreign corporation doing business in Ada 
County in violation of I.C. Section 30-21-502(a) to legally convey real property by a statutory 
Warranty Deed.” R., p. 415.  The district court, in a reasoned and legally sound Order on Motion for 
Relief from Judgment and Stay addressed and rejected each of arguments advanced by McGimpsey 
in his Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions.  As held by the district court:  
McGimpsey’s arguments are not persuasive.  First, he conveniently ignores 
the fact- at least in this motion – that the affirmative defense he raised in 
attempting to defeat D&L’s summary judgment motion was simply a 
restatement of his breach of contract claim – that D&L Breached the Buy-
Sell first because it could not convey marketable title due to its unregistered 
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status. (FN2 – In his brief in opposition to D&L’s motion for fees and costs, 
McGimpsey acknowledged the parties’ claims were “mirror images” of each 
other and, therefore, if his pursuit of claims against D&L was frivolous, then 
so was D&L’s pursuit of claims against him. See Brief ISO Pl’s Rule 
54(d)(5) Motion, p. 9.  In this motion, by contrast, McGimpsey refuses to 
recognize this fact.) In their pleadings, the parties each advanced opposite 
sides of the same claims. In fact, in responding to D&L’s summary judgment 
motion, McGimpsey simply referred to the memorandum in support of his 
own summary judgment motion on his claims. (FN3– Given that it was 
McGimpsey who purposefully intertwined his summary judgment into 
D&L’s summary judgment motion – thus compelling the Court to consider 
both in rendering a decision – McGimpsey can hardly be heard to complain 
that the Court denied him of his constitutional rights by entering judgment 
prior to hearing his summary judgment.)  In rejecting McGimpsey’s 
affirmative defense and concluding that, despite being unregistered, D&L 
had the legal ability to convey the property via warranty deed absent an 
outstanding assessment of income tax, the Court effectively barred 
McGimpsey’s claims as well.  The Judgment Order highlighted this practical 
result, which was a result advanced by D&L at the summary judgment 
hearing.  The Court did not err procedurally or substantively by entering the 
Judgment Order.  Further, McGimpsey’s pending motion to compel merely 
sought the same information at issue in his IRCP 56(d) motion, which this 
Court specifically denied in its order on the summary judgment motion.  
Thus, even if this Court allowed the motion to compel to proceed, the 
information sought would have had no effect on the Court’s summary 
judgment rulings. (FN4 – omitted).   
R., p. 491-496, at p. 493-494.  The district court continued:  
If McGimpsey believes the Court somehow erred by entering the Judgment 
Order and Judgment without allowing him to fully present his three pending 
motions, it was his burden to show the Court – by presentation of facts or 
law – that the motions were meritorious and how they would have affected 
the Court’s ultimate rulings in the case. He has not.  He does not challenge 
the Court’s legal conclusion that an unregistered foreign company doing 
business in Idaho could convey marketable title despite being unregistered 
unless and until income tax has been assessed against the business by federal 
or state taxing authority, thereby subjecting the business’s real property to a 
potential tax lien. He does not challenge the Court’s observation that there 
was no evidence in the record that D&L had been assessed with income tax 
prior to the time of closing set forth in the Buy-Sell. He does not challenge 
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the denial of his IRCP 56(d) motion or otherwise argue his discovery 
requests would have unearthed evidence of such tax assessments. 
McGimpsey has presented this Court with nothing that would entitle him to 
relief from the Judgment.  
Finally, simply because the issues of breach and its materiality are questions 
of fact does not prelude summary judgment where – as here – the material 
facts are determined to be undisputed and only one reasonable inference can 
be drawn therefrom. … In opposing summary judgment, McGimpsey failed 
to raise any genuine dispute as to the facts relevant to breach and materiality. 
Thus, the Court was justified in entering judgment as a matter of law.  
R., p. 494-495. 
 McGimpsey’s present appeal brief is a restatement of his prior Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) 
motion which motion was considered and properly denied by the district court.  McGimpsey does 
not expressly appeal the district court’s Order on Motion for Relief from Judgment and Stay.  
Rather, McGimpsey acknowledges that a “Rule 59(e) motion is considered to be discretionary.”  
Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 29.  Instead, McGimpsey goes on to re-argue the constitutionality of 
the district court’s Judgment.  Id., at p. 29-33.  McGimpsey further argues that the district court 
“tainted the regular order of this case by bolting from the starting gate with an incomplete April 25, 
2018 Memorandum Decision and Order … viewed against the backdrop of a constitutional guaranty 
of due process and an opportunity to be heard, Plaintiff’s three Rule 56 related and pending 
Motion(s) should have been entitled to their judicial due.”  Id.,at p. 32-33.  To re-state the findings 
of the district court:  
If McGimpsey believe the Court somehow erred by entering the Judgment 
Order and Judgment without allowing him to fully present his three pending 
motions, it was his burden to show the Court – by presentation of facts or 
law – that the motions were meritorious and how they would have affected 
the Court’s ultimate rulings in the case. He has not.   
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R., p. 494-495.  As with the proceedings before the district court, McGimpsey does not now adduce 
and evidence or fact that would support his present claim that the district court’s grant of summary 
judgment and entry of Judgment “was an abuse of discretion, inappropriate, [or] clear error.” 
Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 33.  A party waives an issue on appeal if either argument or authority 
is lacking. Powell, 130 Idaho at 128, 937 P.2d at 440. 
 Next, and woven into McGimpsey’s argument of judicial activism (below), McGimpsey 
suggests that the district court simply failed to “grasp the black letter principles of real estate law at 
issue” because the district court did not understand that the “truly litigable claim for the requested 
jury’s determination was the Defendants’ breach of contract caused by their failure or inability to 
deliver marketable title.”   Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 35.  This argument is without merit.  
McGimpsey’s claim that D&L could not legally convey real property by a statutory Warranty Deed 
was raised, but not supported by law or fact, and was therefore denied.  See R., p. 491-496, at p. 
493-494 (quoted above).  McGimpsey gives this Court no additional authority or analysis that 
would support a finding that the district court erred as a matter of law or fact in its grant of summary 
judgment and dismissal of McGimpsey’s Complaint.   
C. McGimpsey’s Claim that the District Court’s Order re Judgment was in Clear Error 
is Unsupported.  
 
 McGimpsey’s next argument, that the district court’s May 7, 2018 Order re Judgment and 
Vacating Summary Judgment Hearing was clear error, it unsupported in law and in fact.  
McGimpsey opens this section of his brief by asserting that the district court was itself a party.  
McGimpsey appears to raise an issue of judicial bias or judicial advocacy but does not support any 
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such claim with cogent authority or facts.   “To properly raise an issue on appeal there must either 
be an adverse ruling by the court below or the issue must have been raised in the court below, an 
issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 397, 64 
P.3d 317, 323 (2003) (citation omitted); See also Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 469, 210 P.3d 
563, 577 (Ct. App. 2009) (“Johnson makes a general argument that the district court 
was biased against him. However, because Johnson did not move to disqualify the district judge, 
he may not raise this issue on appeal. (citations omitted)).  McGimpsey current criticism of 
judicial activism is both misguided and unsupported.   
D. McGimpsey has Failed to Articulate a Legal or Factual Basis to Support a Claim 
that the Judgment is Invalid.  
 
 McGimpsey’s assertion that the May 7, 2018 Judgment is Invalid lacks evidentiary and 
legal support. See Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 37.  In raising this challenge, McGimpsey does 
not question the validity of the current, effective Second Amended Judgment, entered September 
7, 2018.  No appeal has been taken from the Second Amended Judgment.  Consequently, 
McGimpsey’s claim of error with respect to the May 7, 2018 Judgment should be rejected.   
E. The District Court Properly Awarded D&L Restitution. 
 McGimpsey’s final issue on appeal challenges the district court’s award of restitution to 
D&L.  McGimpsey invokes principles of judicial estoppel to argue that D&L previously agreed 
that it was not seeking money “damages.”  Appellant’s Opening Brief, p. 38.  McGimpsey does 
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not accurately cite to the Transcript, nor does he state a cogent theory of relief.6   A party waives 
an issue on appeal if either argument or authority is lacking. Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 
128, 937 P.2d 434, 440 (Ct.App.1997). Furthermore, the decision of whether to award restitution 
is discretionary with the trial court and McGimpsey has failed to demonstrate that the court 
abused that discretion.  See e.g., Krepik v. Tippett, 109 Idaho 696, 701, 710 P.2d 606, 611 (Ct. 
App. 1985) (holding that the district court’s determination of fair rental value was not clearly 
erroneous).  
 On August 15, 2018, McGimpsey filed his Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) Opposition Brief 
wherein McGimpsey argued that D&L was not entitled entry of an amended judgment to include 
additional restitution because D&L waived any such claim. R., p. 554-559.  McGimpsey did not, 
however, previously challenge or raise the award of restitution made pursuant to May 7, 2018 
Judgment or the Amended Judgment issued July 24, 2018.   
 In the Order on Motion to Amend Amended Judgment, the district court rejected 
McGimpsey’s claim of judicial estoppel, finding:  
In responding to D&L’s motion under Rule 59(e), the McGimpseys take 
the opportunity to challenge D&L’s entitlement to all damages. Namely, 
they argue that D&L is judicially estopped from seeking any damages in 
this case because D&L allegedly conceded at the summary judgment 
hearing that it did not incur damages. Not only is the McGimpseys’ 
argument procedurally flawed (FN4 – The McGimpseys have no motion 
to reconsider pending before the Court), it is based on a remarkably 
selective and disingenuous reading of the hearing transcript.  D&L 
conceded at the summary judgment that it did not incur damages as a 
result of the beach of contract, which was based on Philip McGimpsey and 
                                                 
6 McGimpsey’s citation to the Transcript, p. 8, L. 23-25, p. 9, L. 1-13 relates to argument upon the application of 
Idaho Code § 30-21-505.  More accurately cited, D&L’s claim to restitution is addressed at Tr., p. 6, ll. 21-15; p. 8, 
ll. 16-20; p. 11, l. 3 – p. 12, l. 21.  
24 
the Trust’s failure to execute the closing documents for the same of the 
home. D&L never conceded that it lacked damages for the restitution 
claim; in fact, D&L submitted an affidavit by David Asher attesting to the 
reasonableness of the monthly lease amount of $2400.  Unpaid rent 
through eviction was an item of damage sought by D&L from the 
beginning of the suit and was never waived.  As such, the McGimpsey’s 
judicial estoppel argument is unsupportable. Other than the judicial 
estoppel argument, the McGimpseys do not offer any reason why the 
judgment should not be amended to reflect the additional two months they 
remained at the residence without paying rent. 
 
R., p. 576.  Even assuming McGimpsey had followed the correct procedural process to challenge 
the underlying restitution award, the district court’s reasoning and decision denying 
McGimpsey’s challenge to additional restitution is legally and factually sound.  As noted by the 
district court, D&L specifically prayed for restitution and ejectment and D&L did not waive any 
such claim during these proceedings.  McGimpsey’s claim of error in the award of restitution 
should thus be rejected in its entirety.  
   F. D&L is Entitled to An Award of Attorney Fees on Appeal Pursuant to I.C. § 12-121. 
 D&L was awarded its costs by the district court.  No appeal has been taken from the Order 
on Fees and Costs or from that portion of the Second Amended Judgment awarding D&L its costs.  
D&L now seeks entry of an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho Code § 
12-121.  “An award of attorney fees may be granted under I.C. § 12–121 and I.A.R. 41 to the 
prevailing party and such an award is appropriate when the court is left with the abiding belief 
that the appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation.” 
Island Woods Homeowners Ass'n v. McGimpsey, No. 35363, 2010 WL 9585678, at *9 (Idaho Ct. 
App. Mar. 24, 2010) (citing Rendon v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944, 945, 894 P.2d 775, 776 
(Ct.App. 1995)). See also Island Woods Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. Mc Gimpsey, No. 39698, 
2012 WL 9495933, at *9 (Idaho Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2012). 
McGimpsey seeks to re-litigate the same claims he previously raised without success in the 
district court. As the district cornt previously found, repeatedly, McGimpsey's claims as to the 
validity of the Judgment were without merit. McGimpsey offers no new or cogent authority to the 
contrary upon this appeal. An award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-12 1 
and I.A.R. 41 is thus warranted. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, D&L respectfully requests that the Court uphold the decision of 
the district court granting summary judgment in D&L's favor and dismissing McGimpsey's 
Complaint. D&L further requests that the Cou1t award D&L attorney fees on appeal pursuant to 
Idaho Code§ 12- 121. 
DATED this 2,D~ay of December, 2018. 
Jones+ Gledhill+ Fuhrman+ Gourley, P.A. 
By: t( 
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